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Abstract 
As African countries continue in their march towards neo-liberal 
democracy, elite power politics has assumed new but macabre heights. 
The continent’s governing class is demonstrating dramatic behaviour in 
achieving and sustaining power by all means possible. In this article, 
recent experience in Nigerian 2007 general elections and the upcoming 
2011 elections are recalled to argue that rival elements of the governing 
class are engaged in a vicious circle of subordinating one another, albeit 
with no threat to their hegemony. The paper appropriates Michael 
Foucault’s concepts of ‘new economy of power relations’ and 
‘legitimation’ as well as Antonio Gramsci’s terminology of 
‘subordination and hegemony’ to demonstrate that, by both design and 
default, dominant form and structures of power are reproduced and 
sustained by the governing class. The paper shows that dominant elites 
(incumbents and their allies) use state structures and an emerging single-
party machinery to get an upper hand over opposition elites.     
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Introduction 
 
In much of Africa, elite power politics plays a defining role in public and, to a large 
extent, private affairs. The nature of elite political behaviour defines the mood and 
fate of national politics. This is perhaps because in many countries, politics is 
constructed as a game of ‘winner takes all’, rather than a task of nation-building 
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conditioned by rule of law, tolerance, liberty and peace. The holder of power rules 
with impunity, and the benefits of power accrue to a narrow fraction of elites – the 
so-called ‘Mr President and his men’ while large swathes of society wallow in 
object poverty, marginalisation repression and hopelessness. A related factor is 
relative weakness, sometimes sheer absence and/or dysfunctionality, of key 
democratic institutions – such as a strong multiparty system with a principled 
opposition; a robust civil society; an empowered and enlightened voting public and 
a functioning economy. This reality contrasts sharply with developed countries of 
Europe and North America where there are strong party systems, a vibrant civil 
society, a richer and more enlightened citizenry and a more affluent economy. In 
Europe and America, the political class is conscious of its challenges – how to 
make the economy stronger, society happier and play politics by the rule – and 
limitations – failure to perform will result in loss public support, even utter election 
defeat.  
 
In this article, we recall empirical evidence from the Nigerian 2007 and 2011 
general elections to examine the behaviour and performance of Africa’s political 
class in constructing legitimation, subordination and hegemony. The elections 
remain relevant because it provides fresh empirical evidence on the nature elite 
contest for power which, though characterised by injustices and imperfections, 
nonetheless remained relatively unchallenged either by local or international forces. 
As we noted by Tar and Zack-Williams elsewhere, in spite of the fact that the 
elections  
 
generated widespread anger and fury amongst Nigerians, as well as 
local and foreign observers ... both the outgoing President and the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) defiantly 
declared that the election though far from perfect, yet the faults do 
not warrant cancellation. Indeed, Obasanjo cautioned that the 
elections should not be judged against the standards of mature 
democracies of Europe and America (Tar and Zack-Williams, 2007: 
540). 
 
It is argued that the desperate attempt by governing class majority of who are 
aligned to ruling political parties, ‘is informed by the need to maintain the status 
quo… [the political class] has been indicted for manipulating the entire process 
and brokering the victory of Musa Yar’Adua, the president-elect’ (Tar, 2007:549). 
As a demonstration of support for Nigeria’s seemingly shaky status quo, the African 
and international ‘peers’ of Nigeria’s political class extended a flurry of support 
through letters of congratulation and continued support: 
 
it is no surprise that Nigeria’s African peers and international 
creditors remained apparently supportive of the country’s ruling class, 
as its struggles to reproduce dominant power. Their aim is to ensure 
stability in Africa’s most populous nation, rather than sanction 
principled observance of democratic ethos. It is thus reasonable to 
argue that both the ruling class and its international allies are 
complicit in the game of reproducing hegemonic stability in Nigeria 
(Tar, ibid).  
In this article, we examine the elections (and politics in general) in terms of the 
following propositions: (1) elections and its outcome (government) are 
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appropriated by elite political coalitions who go to any level in achieving and 
sustaining power (2) elections are framed by class, gender and generational 
divisions such that the masses, especially women and youths, remained marginal - 
albeit symbolically construed as ‘relevant’ as voters and beneficiaries of party 
promises (3) elections are a complex social and political process in which actors 
play class roles, marked by conflicting interests. Political actors employ both 
rational and profane rhetoric in their pursuit for power. Rationally, they promise to 
ensure national unity, economic stability and rebuild Nigeria’s dilapidated 
infrastructure. Rhetorically, they employ sectarian (ethnic, religious and geo-
political) discourses as a means of appeal to popular support. (4) Elections are a 
theatrical game manipulated by contending actors to favour their ominous whims 
and caprices. In this scenario, there are neither clear rules of engagement, nor a 
level playing field. 
 
Power politics in Africa: some theoretical notes  
 
African chief executives have to work through…the ‘politician’s 
dilemma’. National leaders depend on selective incentives (patronage, 
graft) to build up their political base. Yet an excess of selective 
incentives yields fiscal deficits, inflation and economic stagnation. Poor 
economic performance will threaten the leader’s hold on power. The 
politician’s dilemma is to distribute sufficient resources to keep the 
loyalists happy (so they will finance campaigns, canvass 
neighbourhoods, intimidate rivals), while avoiding economic hardship 
that may alienate the rest of society and destabilize the government 
(Goldsmith, 2004: 89-90). 
  
Faced with the prospect of losing power, those who make political 
decisions may engage in pillage, rather than pursue developmental 
policies that would enhance the welfare of their successors. But they 
may also react differently, trying to increase the welfare of their 
constituents so as to enhance their chances of surviving in power. 
(Przeworski et al, 2000: 189). 
 
A cursory scan of African politics clearly demonstrate the relevance of Foucault’s 
terminology of ‘legitimation’ and ‘new economy of power relations’ (1982:208), 
one in which dominant forms of masculine power are systematically reproduced. 
Foucault’s emphasis on the instrumentality of wealth and knowledge in executing 
masculine power is spectacularly at display in electoral and power politics of many 
African countries. Foucault also uses the term ‘legitimation’ to show the power of 
certain groups (e.g. men, ‘experts’ – also mainly seen as men) to shape and confirm 
the production of certain kinds of knowledge and power. Thus, the political class 
exerts power by the control and legitimation of structures of power and knowledge 
(Forgacs, 1988). Faucault’s conceptualisation has been in spectacular display in 
post-colonial Nigeria. As Aggar (1991) argues the reality in not limited to Nigeria; it 
pervades politics in many societies, particularly those experiencing state 
fragmentation and decline. 
 
Since independence, politics in many African countries have been constructed as 
an exclusive domain of elderly and middle-aged men, the majority of whom have 
accumulated massive wealth, both through corrupt means and opportunistic 
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investment, which they use to fund their political careers. They are a product of a 
targeted western education, the so-called strategic ‘model-schools’ built by the 
British colonial masters to produce Nigerian politicians, bureaucrats and military 
men. In the post-colonial dispensation, however, the new political class oversaw 
the collapse of Nigeria’s burgeoning educational system. Their reasoning appeared 
to be that allowing the mass of society access to a decent modern education risks 
the emergence of enlightened subjects capable of questioning irrational power and 
contesting hegemony. Meanwhile, members of the political class could afford to 
send their own children to overseas universities (mainly in Europe and America) 
where their kind will be safely reproduced. 
 
Marginal social groups such as women, youth and the poor, appear as victims of 
masculine plutocratic hegemony; despite resistance demonstrated by organisations.3 
Such subordinations takes place both in liberal democratic and authoritarian state 
systems. The statistics of political inequality remain grim all over Africa. The 
Nigerian situation is quite revealing and worth considering here. In 2007 women 
are massively underrepresented in the Nigerian parliament, comprising only 6.6 per 
cent of members in the lower House of Representatives (comprising 300+ 
members) and 3.8 percent of the 103 Senators (CDD, 2007). The so-called ‘women 
wings’ of political parties are actually women treated as sex objects, recruited to 
serve the intimate desires of key party actors and for demonstrating male power 
over  the bodies and beauty of women in party functions. A few educated women 
are incorporated into party machines as a symbolical gesture for political 
correctness: but in general, women party leaders are perceived as a genetically 
‘weaker sex’. Youths (defined in Nigerian terms as men below the age of 40) have a 
better representation in the Nigeria parliament and politics at large, but it should be 
noted that most of these so-called youths are beholden to their elderly peers. In 
fact the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) asserted that their 
political role was ‘usually limited to that of campaigning footsoldiers, hired muscle 
or political thugs’ (CDD, 2007:4). 
 
Furthermore, African politics illustrate the Gramscian imagery of hegemonic order in 
which members of the dominant political class (men) struggle to outwit one 
another, not in order to replace the existing status quo but rather to reinforce it, 
based on their narrow visions and interests (Gramsci, 1978). Gramsci argues that in 
a democratic entity, the governing class is often poised and desperate to impose, 
sustain and consolidate its stranglehold on wider society and, specifically, 
marginalised elites. Naturally, he argues, such a system is likely to give rise to 
resistance:   
 
 [Gramsci] deeply understood that the democratic project expresses also a 
radical demand of emancipation and is not a mere constitutional devise 
regulating the selection of a majority. In relation to that understanding, 
Gramsci’s hegemony may recall the notion of an active democracy.’ 
(Urbinati, 1998: 371).  
 
The keywords in Gramsci’s political Thesaurus are hegemony and subordination. By 
subordination is meant the process through which a more powerful fraction of the 
                                               
3 Examples of resistance movement include, in Nigeria, Women in Nigeria (WIN) and the 
Nigeria Youth Council. Similar movements abound all over Africa. 
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political class – e.g. incumbents, and ‘power brokers’ – outwit the weaker and 
vulnerable elites or ‘scavengers for power’ in capturing, sustaining, consolidation 
and, paradoxically, abusing power:  ‘subordination entails a relation of domination 
by which the subjects are deprived of their self-reliance as persons as well as 
citizens. It denotes both a factual condition of powerlessness, and a representation 
of oneself as an impotent hostage in the hands of ineffable destiny’ (Urbinati, 1998: 
370). On the other hand, hegemony denotes a transformation from within, both of 
the subject and its environment such that the dominant class systematically 
perpetuates domination, even on the face of resistance (ibid).  
 
In other words, hegemony refers to the process through which the overall 
dominance of the political class is ensured, sustained and consolidated, even 
though internally it seems to be divided along diverse divisive tendencies – 
ethnicity, religion, gender, geography and generation. In the specific context of 
Nigeria – and perhaps Africa in general – hegemony is a grandiose project 
involving (a) the strategic management of elite fragmentation in what Nyong’o 
(2007: 534), writing on Kenyan political elites, terms ‘joining ranks’ in the most 
powerful collation that is likely to capture and sustain power. This way, not only is 
politics constructed in the mould of Darwinian ‘survival of the fittest’, but most 
importantly elite hegemony is ensured by default. (b) the sustenance of existing 
structures and systems of power, however repressive undemocratic. (c) the 
prevention of real and imagined threat to the elite-dominated status quo – for 
instance, the challenge by anti-establishment voices, actors and interests.     
 
In sum, it is argued that Foucault’s concept legitimation and dominance of masculine 
power (Foucault, 1980; 1982) and Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and subordination 
(Gramsci, 1978) are manifest in the nature of elite power politics in Africa. The 
following sections further explore the dynamics of elite power politics in in the 
particular context of Nigeria. 
 
 
Elections and power politics in Nigeria  
 
Elections provide a theatre of power politics amongst elites in Africa. Such 
moments lay bare elites’ desperation to hang on to power for incumbents, or 
achieve power for marginal elites. For incumbents, state resources and other 
privileges associated with state power are invested in retaining power. And for 
those wanting to gain power, personal wealth and those of “power brokers” are 
patronised to fight their way into power. In this section, the Nigerian 2007 General 
Elections is used as a case study to reveal the nature of elites struggle for power, 
and the issue that influence such struggle. The elections were held against the 
background of the country’s lingering crisis of democracy, in particular, the 
legendary failure of the political class to administer a hitch-free transition from one 
civil regime to another…. 
 
Events before, during and after the 2007 general elections revealed the real politik 
of the extent to which Nigeria’s governing elites have ‘played’ the game of power 
struggle and, by extension, how legitimation, hegemony and subordination were 
played out. 
 
A number of events are pertinent: 
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(a) Politics of incumbency – particularly the move to extend the tenure of 
incumbents who have served two consecutive tenures  
(b) Politicisation of corruption – as a means of hegemonic control 
(c) Privatisation of violence – as a means of asserting might 
(d) Politicisation of sectarian difference – as a tool for political bargain 
(e) Personalisation of state apparatus, particularly by incumbents to their 
advantage, thereby raising doubt about ‘level playing field’.  
(f) The nature of party politics 
On 29 March, 2006 during the official visit of President Obasanjo to the US,  an 
umbrella coalition of Nigerian Diaspora community in the US – Concerned 
Nigerians in the Diaspora (CND) 4 – sent a memo to President Obasanjo, copied 
to the US President, George W. Bush; Senate and Congress as well as the Nigerian 
National Assembly, calling President Obasanjo to abandon his bid to contest for a 
third term: 
We, the undersigned Nigerian citizens in North America, write to express 
our outright and implacable opposition to on-going legislative moves in 
our country Nigeria to amend the constitution to allow, inter alia,  the 
executives in Nigeria (president and governors) three four-year terms. This 
is being widely interpreted as intended to immediately benefit the affected 
incumbents, including yourself…. 
All the governors and yourself who have sworn twice (in 1999 and 2003) to 
uphold the two-term limit of the 1999 Constitution must respect and obey 
it…Consequently you must resist any temptations of “sit-tightism” of 
which too many of our African leaders have been accused. Such schemes 
to remain in power willy-nilly have tarnished the reputations of some of 
your predecessors in Nigeria…. 
Nigeria must act as an example to the rest of the West African sub-region, 
to Africa, and to the World. We do not want “things to fall apart” in our 
country on your insistence to remain in power beyond 2007.  The 
consequences will be too dire…Your current visit to the United States 
therefore presents another golden opportunity in the glare of the whole 
world to right matters. (CND, 2006)   
Obasanjo’s plot to seek third term was eventually scuttled by Nigeria’s National 
Assembly.  In response, it was generally agreed that Obasanjo used state resources 
                                               
4 CND comprised of the following (a) civil society organisations: the World Igbo Congress 
(WIC); Forum for the Advancement of Nigeria (FAN); South-South Peoples Assembly – 
North America (SSPA-NA); Zumunta USA Inc.; Egbe Omo Yoruba - North America; 
Nigerian Democratic Movement (NDM); Okop Usem Leadership Council (OULC); 
Pronaco-USA and Nigerian Policy Council USA. (b) Individuals resident in the USA:  
Tony Nammor, Oloye Awojoodu, Samuel Ayodele, Muminu Badmus, Clement Ikpatt, 
Omoyele Sowore, Godson Nnaka, Titus Folayan, Ezekiel Macham, Olu Oreofe, Titus 
Folayan, Okey Ndibe, Philip Adekunle. The memo was copied to the US President, Senate 
and Congress as well as the Nigerian National Assembly (available: 
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/nvs/letter-to-president-obasanjo-on-third-term-
agenda-on-his-visit-to-the-white.html, accessed 2 May 2010).   
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to spoil the chances of those who worked against his anti-third term agenda. 
Obasanjo enemy-victims spanned members of both the executive and legislature. 
Examples include Senator Mantu (legislature), Atiku Abubakar (executive; former 
Vice Presdent). 
 
The key points from the foregoing is that politicians go to any extent, legitimate or 
otherwise, to achieve power and/or remain in power. In the process, they 
encounter opposition from those who desire to get access to power. A tug-of-war 
ensues leading to: (a) incumbents patronise state resources to institute reprisal 
against anti-incumbency elements (b) opposition become victims of incumbents’ 
reprisals (c) the incumbent support friendly elements or clones “newbreed” to take 
over power; the latter is ensured through electoral malpractice. We will return to 
this issue in a subsequent section. 
  
Underlying Factors: high stakes, stakeholders and ‘bones 
of contention’  
 
Nigeria’s election since independence (1963, 1979, 1993, 1999, 2003, 2007) have 
been highly contested. A number of factors underlie these elections, and determine 
the perceptions, actions and strategies of the political class as elements within it 
competitively jostle to win power – for those who have been out of power and 
desperate to win it – and/or sustain it – for incumbents who want to remain in 
power. Between these actors all sorts of sentiments and divisive tendencies – 
ethnicity, religion, generation, geography etc – are politically unleashed on poor 
and powerless communities of the voting public. Effectively, these communities 
are cajoled to vote on the basis of deceitful reasons.  
 
Below we identify the key factors that were at play during Nigeria’s 2007 general 
elections. 
 
(a): Power-relational Factors 
  
In Nigeria, politicians are more interested in the ends rather than the means of 
achieving power. ‘Get power by all means, the rest will be sorted out’, goes the 
popular Nkurmahist saying amongst politicians. There are different, albeit cross-
cutting, manifestations of the struggles for power: for instance, between the ruling 
party (PDP) and the opposition; politicians from the ‘populous’ north and the 
more ‘educated’ south; majority and minority ethnic groups; resource-bearing and 
‘resource-guzzling’ constituencies; as well as Muslims and Christians. In Nigeria, 
the stakes for power have been phenomenally high, often violent and mysterious, 
as exemplified by the nocturnal assassination of Chief Bola Ige, a serving Minister 
of Justice by hooded gunmen who stormed his residence in 2001 or, more recently, 
the murder of Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmood Adam, a Muslim spiritual leader with a 
populist following, on the eve of state elections in Kano. The point is, politically-
motivated violence appeared to intensify and mystify the stakes for power. In 
certain circumstances, however, there have emerged compromises and pacts as 
demonstrated by the election of Obasanjo in April 1999. At that point, Obasanjo 
appeared to be acceptable to nearly all shadings of Nigeria’s political spectrum 
(Obadare, 2006:665). Since then, Obasanjo has dramatically developed some 
‘gothic’ traits, not least his reinvention of militaristic tendencies in dealing with civil 
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matters – as demonstrated by his role in the promulgation of a new Act to lynch 
organised labour (2004) or his issuance of presidential orders to the Nigerian Army 
to liquidate the Odi community for allegedly providing shelter to armed bandits 
attacking oil companies in the Niger Delta (1999). Power politics in Nigeria is 
murky, violent and ‘winner-takes all’. 
 
(b) Institutional-Systemic Factors 
 
Here, we have a number of structural short-comings capable of undermining both 
politics and elections. For instance, the Centre for Democracy and Development 
(CDD)] identified the following, which it called on the Government and the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to address, to no avail: 
 
 The subservience of the INEC to the Presidency, rendering the former 
beholden to the latter’s whims; 
 The ill-defined and contradictory nature of electoral laws and codes of 
conduct, particularly regarding exclusion of independent candidates, 
disenfranchisement of the Nigerians living abroad or members of the 
security forces, and the rules which permit functionaries of political parties 
to take up position in INEC. 
 Lack of ground rules on party funding leading to disagreements between 
‘power brokers’, party financiers, party officials/members and candidates. 
 Lack of a transparent voting mechanism – particularly, INEC’s 
characteristic failure to organise a credible voter register and/or ensure that 
all voters cast their votes on voting days.  
 Reluctance of the state and INEC to allow for widest possible participation 
of local and international election monitors, and the media. 
 A dysfunctional party system characterised by a strong ruling party (PDP) 
but a plethora of weak oppositional parties.   
 Pervasive violence and impunity for offenders: those who commit electoral 
fraud and acts of violence (e.g. party militias and their patrons) are buoyed 
up by the knowledge that, as very few such offences are successfully 
prosecuted ‘they can expect to enjoy almost complete impunity for their 
actions. More usual is that beyond an initial police intervention, politically-
related crimes and human rights abuses are simply not investigated’ (CDD 
2007:4). 
 
(c) Election-Specific Factors 
 
Here, we factors relating to fairness in the conduct and outcome of elections. 
Event leading to the 2007 general elections clearly demonstrated that within the 
political class, there was a feeling of mutual suspicion as each contender was poised 
to win power by all means. While incumbents were building strategies for retaining 
power, opposition parties and civil society were worried about how far elections 
could be ‘free and fair’, given the pathological manifestations of fraudulent 
tendencies amongst incumbents in their bid to stay in power. In the context of the 
2007 elections, Ibrahim identified the following key election-specific issues of 
fraud:  
 
 Compilation of fictitious names on voters’ registers  
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 illegal compilation of separate voters’ lists  
 illegal printing of voters’ cards  
 illegal possession of ballot boxes  
 stuffing of ballot boxes  
 falsification of election results  
 illegal thumb-printing of ballot papers  
 voting by children  
 illegal printing of forms used for collation and declaration of 
election results  
 deliberate refusal to supply election materials to certain areas 
 announcing results in places where no elections were held 
 unauthorized announcement of election results  
 harassment of candidates, agents, and voters  
 change of list of electoral officials; and   
 box-switching and inflation of figures  
(Ibrahim, 2007:3)  
 
These were confirmed by both local and international observers (for details, see 
Tar and Zack-Williams, 2007; Tar, 2007). It is worthy of note that, therefore, that 
to a greater or lesser extent, all political parties and politicians were/are implicated 
in these acts as they struggled to enhance their stake in the political game. 
 
Stakeholders in Nigerian General Elections of 2007: an 
exemplar of power politics  
 
Below we classify the key actors involved in the elections of 2007. We identify the 
villains and vanquished from amongst key political contenders; those who played 
cameo roles, particularly from state institutions; and spectators from civil society.  
 
 
(a) Villains & bullies: Obasanjo, the State and PDP  
 
Since 1999, when the military handed over power to civilian democrats, Nigeria’s 
fledgling democracy has remained hotly contested and unstable. Key ‘bones of 
contention’ include the monopoly and abuse of power by ex-President Obasanjo 
and the ruling Peoples Democratic Party – both of whom effectively transformed 
from democratic actors to political monsters, displaying lack of transparency in 
governance, and prebendal practices. In principle, the 1999 constitution has set 
clear provisions for checking abuses of power and there are rules of engagement 
for party politics as provided in the Electoral Act 2003. For instance, parties must 
ensure ‘internal democracy’ by making sure that membership and leadership 
reflects Nigeria’s ‘federal character’; and the President must submit to parliament 
his choice of candidates for all political appointments. In reality, however, both the 
President and his ruling party have either defied these regulations or manipulated 
them to their advantage. Money and muscle were in constant display in ensuring that 
political appointments, legislation and policies are favourable to the president and 
the ruling party.  
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A key example in this regard was the foiled attempt by outgoing president, 
Obasanjo, to contest for a third term by seeking a review of the 1999 constitution 
(which provides for only two consecutive terms) and unleashing a carefully-
planned legislative lobby. Obasanjo’s failure to secure a third term led to more 
dramatic consequences. First, it effectively disallowed the president and some state 
governors from pursuing their incumbency agenda. This led to desperate last-
minute deals by the outgoing president and governors to secure safe successors. 
Obasanjo chose Umaru Yar’Adua, a hitherto little-known Governor of Katsina 
State and sibling to a former close ally assassinated by a previous military junta – 
GeneralShehu Yar’Adua. Secondly, it led to party scandals and personal rivalries – 
e.g. between Obasanjo and his Vice President (Atiku Abubakar). The former 
suspected the latter of undermining his third term bid and therefore sought to 
destroy his political ambition. Atiku was eventually sacked from the ruling party 
(PDP) and forced to form his own party, the Action Congress to allow him to 
contest for presidency.  
 
(b) Circumstantial beneficiaries: Umaru Yar’Adua, Goodluck 
Jonathan and Others 
 
Nigeria’s late president, UmaruYar’Adua, and his successor Goodluck Jonathan 
emerged from relative promiscuity to national prominence. Both were relatively 
unknown prior to their announcement as the flag bearers of the ruling PDP. Both 
were fortuitous beneficiaries of uncertain party politics and personality rivalries 
within PDP. Yar’dua was, by profession, a chemistry teacher and a graduate of 
Ahmadu Bellos University Zaria. As the son of a former minister and the sibling of 
late General Shehu Yar’Adua, he inherited massive wealth. In 1999, he was elected 
the governor of Katsina State. Though soft-spoken and influential in his state, he 
was inconsequential in national and party politics. Nobody expected him to emerge 
as a presidential candidate. Indeed, until recently, many saw the former ex-Vice 
President Atiku as the President-in-waiting. As a result of personal rivalries, by 
mid-2006, the ruling party was in deep crisis. In the end, Obasanjo succeeded in 
manipulating party primaries, rigging the defeat of many popular candidates and 
imposing Yar’Adua as PDP’s candidate. After leaving power in May, Obasanjo has 
assumed the role of party Chairman of PDP and regularly commutes to Abuja to 
consult with the new president. To sell the candidacy of Yar’Adua, Obasanjo and 
the ruling party successfully staged a spin regarding Yar’Adua’s transparency profile 
and stewardship in Katsina State. On assuming power in 2003, Yar’Adua declared 
his assets to Nigeria’s Code of Conduct Bureau – a statutory requirement for all 
public officers, although many of Yar’Adua’s peers either refused to declare their 
assets or presented false figures. Apart from this, Yar’Adua did not perform any 
economic miracle in Katsina – like his counterparts elsewhere, he struggled to 
justify the state’s massive federal revenue by building schools, and renovating 
hospitals and roads (some of which have already begun to break up). A formidable 
campaign was mounted to trumpet Yar’Adua as a pristine and transparent figure – 
a rarity in Nigeria! In reality, Yar’Adua transparency rhetoric was an exaggerated 
scam aimed at over-shadowing more questionable aspects of his candidacy  - such 
as his being Obasanjo’s choice, his military connections, and failing health (in the 
heat of electioneering campaigns, Umaru Yar’Adua was flown to Germany for 
urgent medical attention).     
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On the other hand, President Goodluck was a former university lecturer who came 
to power initially as a selected deputy Governor of River State following the 
impeachment of the elected office holder. Thereafter, Goodluck eventually  
“inherited” the seat of the Governor following the impeachment of former 
Governor on grounds of corruption and abuse of office.  
 
At the state level, many candidates for Governorship and parliamentary positions 
emerged, in a similar manner, as fortuitous beneiciaries. For instance, in Nasarawa 
State, ex-Governor Abdullahi Adamu, stroke deal with his long time rival, Aliyu 
Doma, who decamped from his party and join the ruling PDP as a ‘winning 
candidate’. Doma was strategically recruited by Adamu because he was desperate 
to become a governor (having lost in all elections since 1990s) and, therefore, very 
prone to succumb to Adamu’s whims and caprices. Doma won with a landslide 
victory.  
 
(c) Vanquished & victims of circumstance: Atiku Abubakar, 
Muhammadu Buhari and the Opposition  
 
Expectedly, there were more losers and victims of circumstance than winners and 
villains – this is common in most situations of conflict and power struggles. First,  
ex-vice president Atiku Abubakar was indicted by Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) on trumped up charges of corruption and was eventually 
banned from contesting elections. Atiku filed series of court motions questioning 
the legality of his ban. He lost in both high court and the court of appeal. On 
appeal to the Supreme Court, however, Atiku’s ban was over-turned. Meanwhile, 
in the course of court proceedings which lasted till the eve of presidential elections, 
the presidency issued a circular in which all civil servants and political appointees 
attached to the office of the vice president were redeployed and/or sacked. By the 
time he had cleared his name, the game was too late for Atiku. Suffice it to say that 
even if Atiku had succeeded earlier in clearing his name, his exclusion from the 
ruling PDP was enough to effectively curtail his presidential ambitions. Other 
losers and victims of circumstance include Ibrahim Babangida, a former military 
dictator who presided over one of the longest period of military rule in Nigerian 
post-colonial history. He was seen to be instrumental in the behind-the-curtain 
deals which brought Obasanjo to power in 1999, but fell out with Obasanjo for his 
alleged role in aborting Obasanjo’s third term plan. It also includes General 
Muhammadu Buhari, a former military head of state and the candidate of the 
strongest opposition party, the All Nigeria Peoples Party. Many see him as one of 
the most transparent political leaders in Nigeria. Other party leaders who were 
marginalised were Abahiru Bafarawa of the Democratic Peoples Party and  
Odemegwu Ojukwu of All Progressives Grand Allaince. Buhari, Bafarawa and 
Ojukwu were the strongest opposition figures but together their vote was far less 
than that won by Yar’Adua. In sum, opposition parties and figures were unable to 
withstand the monstrous machination of Obasanjo’s ruling party.  
 
(c) Spoilers, cameos & opportunists: Maurice Iwu, Nuhu Ribadu 
and the politics of ‘gatekeeping’ 
 
Of course, there were spoilers as well as those ‘out make the most of the game’. 
This is particularly the case in Obasanjo’s camp and the ruling party. The 
opportunistic figures were recruited both from/into state ‘gatekeeper’ institutions, 
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and amongst party stalwarts. Key examples include Professor Iwu, the Chairman of 
INEC (Nigerian Electoral Commission) and Nuhu Ribadu the boss of IFCC 
(Economic and Financial Crimes Commission). Both INEC and EFCC became 
formidable state institutions for indicting specific actors (those in the bad books of 
Mr President) and banning them from contesting for power. Most individual cameos 
and spoilers are controversial characters. For instance, until his mysterious 
appointment in 2004 as INEC Chairman by President Obasanjo, Iwu led a 
controversial professional life style. A recent investigative report titled ‘Maurice 
Iwu: the Full Story of a Fraudulent Umpire’ reveals ‘shady activities 
surrounding Maurice Iwu and his non-profit organization – Bioresources 
Development and Conservation Inc. (BDCP [registered in the USA]) which Iwu 
founded and piloted as his research outfit since 1993’ (Sowore & Ellis-Ezenekwe, 
2007). The Report indicts Iwu of tax evasion, dubious research activities, personal 
enrichment and immigration scams. If such staggering revelations are anything to 
go by, it shows that Iwu lacks the moral integrity to lead a national electoral 
institution. Similarly, Ribadu was accused of ‘selective justice’ in indicting some, 
rather than all corrupt politicians. Paradoxically, it is a common practice of the 
Nigerian political class to recruit dubious personalities into its rank to shamelessly 
execute certain strategic class functions.      
  
Spectators and Observers 
 
In this category, we find the most influential as well as the inconsequential. There 
were civil society groups – both local and overseas – who monitored the elections 
and criticised the events as fraught with violence and fraud. There were also 
individual by-standers, such as Nobel laureate Wale Soyinka and novelist Chinua 
Achebe who have been fearlessly persistent in criticising the lowly conduct of 
politics in Nigeria. In the aftermaths of the 2007 presidential election, Soyinka was 
the first to demand a re-run and asked both Iwu and Obasanjo to resign 
immediately. He even attended a congressional hearing in the US where he called 
for a stiff sanction on Nigerian elites. Sadly, the impact of civil society in 
influencing rational behaviour has remained severely limited. 
 
 
Election 2011: Unfolding dramas in elite power politics in 
Nigeria   
 
At we write, and as Nigeria prepares for a general election in January 2011, an 
intense elite power struggle is taking place in the country. The core of this elite 
politics is happening within the ruling PDP. A precursor to the drama was the 
election in 2007 of Umaru Yar’Adua (a northern candidate) to replace former 
President Obasanjo (a southern candidate) who was forced out of power following 
an unsuccessful to bid to run for a third term. Within the PDP, there is an informal 
“elite pact” to rotate key elective and political posts between geopolitical regions of 
the country. Through this intra-party arrangement, Yar’Adua’s presidency was 
slotted for the north, the vice presidency to the south, the national chair of the 
party to the South and so on. This arrangement remained in place until the 
untimely death of President Yar’Adua. 
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Since assuming power, Yar’Adua was embattled by poor health. His reign was 
characterised by prolonged absence on sick leave and/or hidden trips abroad for 
urgent medical treatment. In May 2010, President Yar’Adua died after a prolonged 
illness in Saudi Hospital. Thereafter, his deputy Jonathan Goodluck was hastily 
sworn-in as provided by the 1999 Constitution. While the late President was on 
sick leave, an  intense in-fighting was happening between the inner caucus of late 
President’s kitchen cabinet (who struggled “hook, line and sinker” to shield the late 
President’s state of sickness), and those in support of the then Vice President 
Goodluck. An intervention by the national assembly allowed Goodluck to assume 
interim responsibility as acting President and, following Yar’Adua death, he was 
effectively sworn in as substantive President. Since assuming power, Goodluck has 
executed a cabinet reshuffle aimed at consolidating his grip on power. He has also 
initiated an economic reforms (particularly in the energy and oil sectors), signed an  
Electoral Act into law and reconstituted the Independent National Electoral 
Commission, among others. 
 
Meanwhile, in the run up to the 2011 general election, pro-Goodluck supporters 
called on him to contest for the Presidency, against PDP’s internal zoning 
arrangement which sanctioned Nigeria’s Presidency to the north between 2007 and 
2015. The argument of pro-Goodluck supporters is that PDP’s zoning 
arrangement is an informal and unbinding farce, and that Goodluck should not be 
deprived of his constitutional right to contest. On the other hand, the supporters 
of zoning claimed that if Goodluck contests, it will spell doom for both the party 
and country.  
 
As we write, Goodluck has already declared his intention to contest for the 
Presidency. So also are his key “rival” northern candidates such as former 
President General Ibrahim Babangida, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, and 
former National Security Advicer to the President, General Aliyu Gusau. The 
drama is still unfolding and the outcome remains to be seen. The PDP will hold its 
primary in the coming weeks to choose a Presidential flag bearer. There are 
speculations that PDP primaries will be a litmus test for both the party and nation. 
Some argue that the party is in the precipice of doom, while others argue that it 
will emerge stronger with Goodluck (an incumbent) as its candidate. In any case, 
Nigeria has a weak, poorly organised opposition who do not pose any significant 
threat to PDP.    
 
Conclusive remarks  
 
This paper reveals the nature of elite power politics in Africa, based on empirical 
data from Nigeria. The paper reveals that power is constructed, in the main, as a 
domain dominated by elderly men who struggle to win and/or sustain it by all 
means necessary. Elections, it is argued provide a theatre for such power struggle. 
The following conclusions are derived from the foregoing analysis. First, electoral 
politics in particular and politics in general are gendered phenomena in which male 
and generational power is systematically reproduced. It is no coincidence that the 
key examples of actors cited throughout this piece – villains, victims, beneficiaries 
and cameos – are all adult men. Secondly, and by extension, the politics of 
hegemonic order was at spectacular display. Though the ruling regime effectively 
dominated the game and used state machinery to victimise potential enemies 
within the ranks of the political class, this has not degenerated into full-blown 
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national crises. In fact, the political class managed to scale through each potentially 
scandalous incident–exclusion of some from parties, court proceedings, electoral 
irregularities etc. Finally, as a game with stake and stakeholders, it should not come 
as a surprise that Nigerian 2007 presidential election was characterised by fraud, 
violence, spin and intimidation.  
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